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there is no question about the stature and influence of both Stephen Cardinal Kim Sou-hwan and Jaime l. Cardinal Sin in their respective nations as well as the asian and global 
landscapes. during their tenure as archbishops in their country’s 
capitals and at the time of their demise in February 16, 2009 and June 
21, 2005, respectively, both were hailed as exceptional leaders in their 
own right, whose contributions toward the democratization of their 
countries transcended religious and national boundaries.
We conjure the figure of Cardinal Kim speaking to workers, 
students and many others on the grounds of the myeongdung Cathedral 
in Seoul. We hear the voice of Cardinal Sin over radio Veritas calling 
all listeners to surround two military camps in EdSa (Epifanio de los 
Santos Avenue) to protect defecting officers and soldiers against the 
onslaught of troops loyal to the marcos regime. these remind us of 
*an earlier version of this essay was delivered at the conference “Church 
leadership in asia in memory of Stephen Cardinal Kim” sponsored by 
the graduate School of theology, Sogang University in Seoul, Korea on 
September 17-18, 2009.
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the critical role each played in dismantling authoritarian rule in 1986 
in the Philippines and 1987 in Korea.
Because of their singular roles, one is tempted to see them as 
prominent figures isolated from their own contexts. this essay 
proposes to look at both as profoundly imbedded in their contexts, in 
the hope of not only demonstrating their full significance but also of 
showing how their contexts shaped their very contributions. though it 
does not undertake a theological critique of their views, it offers a broad 
analysis of their actions and some of their important writings during 
this period, albeit limited to those available in English.1 this analysis 
points to some similarities and differences between Cardinals Kim 
and Sin, and illustrates how our theological view of what constitutes 
pastoral leadership is historicaly mediated in the concrete context 
in which it takes place. Hence, it suggests a general hermeneutic for 
conceiving pastoral leadership in context.
There are three main parts to this essay: (a) their task as “heirs” 
in the post-Varican II era, (b) their location in the social context and 
(c) their pastoral response as leaders in context.
Their Task as “Heirs” in the post-Vatican II Era
one could rightly characterize the leadership of Cardinals Kim 
and Sin in terms of the mission to implement the spirit and the letter 
of the historic Second Vatican Council, especially in the light of 
subsequent synodal and papal documents. For instance, both often 
quoted from conciliar documents and papal writings such as Evangelii 
Nuntiandi [1975] and Redemptor Hominis [1979]. though products of and 
already church leaders in the preconciliar period, both devoted their 
1Since most these were spoken at particular occasions, references to them 
include the year of delivery followed by their location in published anthologies 
or other sources.
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subsequent leadership to a serious commitment to the aggiornamento 
movement that inspired, convened and implemented the council.
However, Cardinal Kim’s ascendancy to episcopal leadership in 
Seoul almost immediately after the council in 1968 left a profound 
mark on his person and views. Moreover, his involvement as one of the 
bishops who conceived the formation of what would eventually become 
the Federation of asian Bishops’ Conferences (FaBC) strengthened 
his own commitment to the council. In the light of this involvement, 
documented in many published accounts, his later reflection truly 
captures his own understanding of the FABC’s task and his own 
mission as episcopal leader within it:
I thought then that for the future and evangelization of asia in a 
rapidly developing world the bishops’ conferences needed cooperation 
among themselves. Such mutual help would not only contribute greatly 
to the development of the Catholic Church in asia, but it would have 
the potential of making a major contribution to human development, 
advancing justice and creating a human being-centered society, all of 
which were badly needed in many countries.2
thus Jesuit theologian C. g. arevalo, awarded by the just-concluded 
ninth FaBC general assembly in manila for his involvement and 
service since its inception, appropriately refers to the post-conciliar 
period in asia as “the time of the heirs.”3 From this perspective, he 
rightly calls Cardinal Kim as one of FaBC’s “founding fathers”: “It 
was his initiative which convened the organizing meeting in manila 
during Pope Paul IV’s 1970 visit.”4
2“Founding Father reflects on FABC’s origin and development,” Asia Focus 
( Jan 6, 1995), 3.
3Catalino arevalo, “…the time of the Heirs,” in For All the Peoples of 
Asia: Federation of Asian Bishops’ Conferences Documents from 1970 to 1991 I, eds. 
gaudencio B. rosales and Catalino g. arevalo (Quezon City: Claretian 
Publications, 1997), xv.
4arevalo, “on His Eminence,” 173.
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Furthermore, Cardinal Kim’s words about the need for the FaBC 
allude to some of the major themes of the council—evangelization 
and its concommitant involvement in human development and 
justice—all of which appear in many of his addresses as well as in 
those of Cardinal Sin who only became archbishop nine years after 
the close of the council.
the theme of the mission of evangelization shared by all Christians 
was a constant refrain for both Cardinals Kim and Sin in their speeches. 
Whether speaking to Irish Columban missionaries to Korea [1971]5 
or asian Catholics [1988],6 to a gathering of catechists [1970]7 or even 
to those about to be confirmed [1975],8 Cardinal Kim never failed to 
challenge all to take up the mission to evangelize.
Cardinal Sin, too, emphasized this importance of the mission 
of evangelization. In the 1977 conference on mission in mexico, he 
enjoined all in the following words: “It is not enough, according to 
Vatican II, for the Church to be present and to organize within a nation, 
nor is it also sufficient to carry on an apostolate of good example. For 
the goal of its presence and organization is to announce Christ, in 
word and in deed, to non-Christians and to help them receive Christ 
in the plenitude” [1977].9
Perhaps their insistence on evangelization came from their keen 
awareness of the small number of Christians in asia and thus of what 
appears to be the seeming failure of Christianity in asia. Cardinal Kim 
could only count 300,000 Catholics out of the seven million population 
5Stephen Sou-Hwan Kim, The Complete Collection of Cardinal Kim Vol. I (Seoul: 
Catholic Publishing House, 2001), 9–14.
6Kim, The Complete Collection of Cardinal Kim I, 232–37.
7Kim, The Complete Collection of Cardinal Kim I, 375–84.
8Kim, The Complete Collection of Cardinal Kim I, 427–30.
9Vijan dumol, ed., A Cry … A Song: Selected Writings of Jaime Cardinal L. Sin 
(Quezon City: archdiocese of manila, 1989), 70.
5Cardinals Kim and Sin in Context: a Hermeneutics of Pastoral leadership
in his diocese [1971].10 Similar figures are not lost on Cardinal Sin who 
frequently reminded Filipino Christians of their “special missionary 
vocation” on account of their “providential history” as the only 
Christian nation in asia then:
But to be a chosen people is always, in the plans of god, to receive 
a responsibility in service to him …. Pope Paul IV enjoined us to 
thank our heavenly Father for ‘four hundred years of grace.’ But such 
gratitude, for so much given, for so much received, can only open up 
to a mission shaped for us by that same loving goodness. ‘To proclaim 
His truth, His love, His justice and salvation before [our] neighbors, 
the peoples of asia’ [1981].11
Both Cardinal Kim and Cardinal Sin were thus aware of the reality of 
religious pluralism in asia. as in his address at the East asian Pastoral 
Institute after being conferred an honorary degree by the ateneo 
de manila University, Cardinal Kim echoed the Vatican Council’s 
Nostra Aetate on the Church’s recognition of what is true and holy in 
these religions. On another occasion, he spoke of how Confucianism, 
Buddhism and Hinduism “reveal the depths of human existence, and 
facilitate virtuous living” [1992].12
But Cardinal Sin added another dimension to “the sad fact of a 
‘not-yet-Catholic Asia,’ and a hope, the hope of a ‘Catholic-Asia’—or 
at least an asia where the Catholic faith will feel at home and thrive 
as in its own motherland” [1978].13 Here he indicated a possible reason 
for Christianity’s apparent failure in asia:
If Catholicism in the Asian continent enters by the paths of ‘authentic 
inculturation,’ if it follows the clear directives of Vatican II in the 
decree on the Church’s missionary activity and the declaration on 
non-Christian religions, if the Church in asia generously endeavours 
10 Kim, The Complete Collection of Cardinal Kim I, 13.
11dumol, A Cry … A Song, 104.
12 Kim, The Complete Collection of Cardinal Kim I, 255.
13dumol, A Cry … A Song, 76.
6 Francisco
to integrate Christianity into the asian life and the asian people while 
preserving its universal character—as the 1974 Synod on Evangeization 
so forcefully proposed—then ‘yes.’ Catholicism will be a living reality 
in asia, it will permeate the lives of many asians, it will be at home in 
Asia: it will be—if you allow me to put it this way—it will be ‘again’ 
(not simply become) an asian religion [1978].14
given this need for an “asian Christianity”—perhaps more 
emphasized by Cardinal Sin than Cardinal Kim—both still agreed on 
the fundamental reason for the seeming failure of mission in terms 
of the minority of Christians in asia. Cardinal Kim “came to the 
conclusion that the answer to this painful ‘WHY?’ lay in the lack of 
love such as described in Paul’s 1st Corinthians chapter 13,” of “the 
radical love demanded of us” [1980].15 He repeated similar words at 
another occasion many years later: “I am convinced in my heart that 
only an awareness of the love of Jesus can bring people to believe in 
him. only an experience of this love can attract those, who live in a 
materialistic world, to Jesus” [1997].16 He elaborated on this importance 
of love for mission and its relation to Christianity’s “failure in asia”: 
“one is that we have not experienced love. We have not loved Christ 
and we have not loved people. the other is that we have brought 
Christ to others in world only, but we have not truly followed him, we 
have not become like Him” [1997].17 not surprisingly then, mother 
teresa of Calcutta is referred to as the paragon of this love [1997]18 
and mahatma gandhi’s comment about “Christians not being Christ-
like” cited often [1997].19
14dumol, A Cry … A Song, 79.
15Kim, The Complete Collection of Cardinal Kim I, 92–3.
16Kim, The Complete Collection of Cardinal Kim I, 312.
17Kim, The Complete Collection of Cardinal Kim I, 280–81.
18Kim, The Complete Collection of Cardinal Kim I, 287.
19Kim, The Complete Collection of Cardinal Kim I, 281.
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this emphasis on love as the way of evangelization is similarly 
found in Cardinal Sin’s writings. at his installation as bishop in the 
Jaro diocese during the turbulent 1970s, he told the gathered faithful: 
“The next time you are tempted to wave a placard saying, ‘down with 
this, down with that,’ shout instead, ‘UP WITH BROTHERHOOD, 
UP WITH UNITY, UP WITH LOVE!’ … The crying need today is 
for a revolution—a revolution of love, of Christian love” [1972].20 He 
even repeated this call at his 1974 installation as archbishop of manila, 
two years after President marcos’ declaration of martial law:
I issued the call at a time when activists rule[d] the streets, when, in an 
orgy of violence against the Establishment, they raised their arms in 
defiance and their voices in a hymn of hate. Their voices today are no 
longer heard, but the need for that revolution of love remains [1974].21
These words of Cardinal Sin on love as well as his trademark closing 
line, “I love you all very dearly,” were not sentimental piety addressed 
to an equally sentimental people. they were deeply rooted in his 
understanding of evangelization not only in the Philippines but in all 
of asia. In a 1981 Vienna Convention on missions, he said,
the Christian faith and the Christian gospel are not about statistic[s], 
even about human ‘religious’ statistics. Rather it is about a life which 
god shares with hearts which open themselves to His love, with people 
[who] receive His mercy into their lives [1981].22
These words from Cardinal Sin speak of the task that he and Cardinal 
Kim shared as “heirs of the Faith” in a post Vatican II era. Both took 
it upon themselves to preach the gospel of Christ in and through love 
to asia. How they accomplished this can only become clear when they 
are seen in their respective contexts.
20dumol, A Cry … A Song, 41–2.
21dumol, A Cry … A Song, 50. 
22dumol, A Cry … A Song, 102.
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Their Location in the Social Context
the social contexts within which Cardinal Kim and Cardinal Sin 
envisioned the evangelizing mission of the Church in love could not 
have been more different, save for the brutal reality of the authoritarian 
governments that ruled both Korea and the Philippines during the 
most significant period of their episcopal leadership. Park Chung-Hee 
came to power through a military coup in 1961 and ruled until his 
assassination in 1979, only to be replaced by Chun doo-Hwan whose 
presidency until 1987 proved to be more repressive. Ferdinand marcos 
extended his presidential term by proclaiming martial law in 1972 and 
remained in power until the 1986 People Power revolution.
The authoritarian regimes of Park Chung-Hee and his successor 
and that of Ferdinand marcos had much in common in terms of their 
broad political, social and economic outlines. First, both regimes were 
essentially military. Park and Chun were military generals; Marcos was 
a World War II soldier and an elected President with military support. 
Their regimes were established through military force. Park and 
Chun came to power through the 1961 and 1980 coups, while marcos 
dissolved the existing civilian government and set up another under 
his control through martial law. thus the military in both countries 
assumed a crucial political role. It promoted compliance with directives 
from their leaders and investigated, and meted out punishment for, 
non-compliance. thus the Korean Central Intelligence agency (KCIa) 
became infamous for their brutality. mcCoy writes that “under marcos 
… military murder was the apex of a pyramid of terror—3,257 killed, 
35,000 tortured, and 70,000 incarcerated … some 2,520, or 77 percent 
of all victims, were ‘salvaged’—that is, tortured, mutilated, and dumped 
on a roadside for public display.”23
23Alfred McCoy, “Dark Legacy: Human Rights Under the Marcos Regime,” 
in Memory, Truth Telling and the Pursuit of Justice: A Conference on the Legacies of the 
Marcos Dictatorship (Quezon City: Office of Research and Publication, Ateneo 
de manila University, 2001), 131.
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At the same time, both Park and Marcos were keen to camouflage 
the military nature of their rule and thus devised similar ways to 
cover it with civilian legitimacy. Park resigned from the military and 
formed the democratic republican Party to run as President. after 
his victory, he declared martial law, dissolved the national assembly 
and called a referendum to ratify his Yushin-Constitution [Vitalization 
reform Constitution]. marcos’ strategies were just as elaborate. Upon 
declaring martial law, he appointed all local officials and manipulated 
ratification of a new Constitution suited to legitimate his rule. In the 
face of rising civil unrest and opposition, he replaced martial law with 
“constitutional authoritarianism” in 1981 when Pope John Paul II 
visited, and oversaw elections for a rubber-stamp unicameral legislative 
in 1984.24 But despite all these changes, the military character of 
governance prevailed in both Korea and the Philippines.
Second, fundamental rights and freedoms were curtailed, if not 
entirely suppressed. This was initially justified by both Park and Marcos 
through the specter of Communism. Communist north Korea cast a 
long shadow in the South. though revitalized, the Communist Party 
of the Philippines could not have wrested power then. What in fact 
occurred through outright force or psychological intimidation was the 
practical disappearance of any space in civil society for independent 
discussion and critique, be it from organized opposition or ordinary 
citizens. Prominent opposition leaders were arrested and imprisoned. 
Kim Dae-Jung, who narrowly lost to Park in 1971 and later became 
president in 1997, was abducted in Tokyo and imprisoned in Korea 
in 1973. during Chun’s regime, he was again imprisoned in the 
aftermath of the 1980 Kwangju massacre of students and condemned 
to death. Senator Benigno aquino, marcos’ nemesis, was arrested with 
the declaration of martial law and remained in solitary confinement 
and later exile in the U.S.a. until his 1983 assassination. Countless 
people were harrassed, detained and even executed by government 
24Joaquin Bernas, Philippine Constitutional Law (Manila: Rex Book Store, 1984), 
xix–xxiii.
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instrumentalities or allied “private groups” on mere suspicion of 
opposing those in power.
All forms of media were closely monitored and often taken over 
by the state or its collaborators. In his story of the Park regime, Janelli 
shows “how the state intervened in the media not so much by forbidding 
news but by limiting the size and placement of stories, regulating the 
wording of headlines, and shaping the general slant of reports, all to 
make its economic policy choices more palatable.”25 an atmosphere 
characterized by possible spying and thus distrust permeated educational 
institutions, civic organizations and even neighboorhood or family 
groups. In Korea, the KCIa as “an arm of the executive … penetrated 
nearly every arena of Korean life, with agents in factories, central and 
local government offices, and university classrooms.”26
Third, the general economic policies and activities of the Park, Chun 
and marcos regimes were similar too, perhaps because both accepted 
the prevailing paradigm for development then and maintained strong 
economic links with both Japan and the West, particularly the U.S.A.27 
After assuming power in 1961, Park 
remov[ed] a number of other hindrances to the operation of free 
markets while providing public goods to foster market operation. 
Specific measures included promoting exports through various 
economic incentives, encouraging manufacturing industries that would 
allow South Korean enterprises to take advantage of their low-cost 
25roger Janelli, Making Capitalism: The Social and Cultural Construction of a South 
Korean Conglomerate (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 65.
26Bruce Cummings, “the origins and development of the northeastern 
asian Political Economy: Industrial Sectors, Product Cycles, and Political 
Consequences,” in The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism, ed. Frederic 
deyo (Ithaca and london: Cornell University Press, 1987), 72.
27Eric Hanson, Catholic Politics in China and Korea (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis 
Books, 1980), 3–4.
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labor through international trade, and opening access to international 
credit markets by guaranteeing loans for major enterprises.”28
With Park’s assassination, Chun’s
new strategy, constituting a second outward turn, was also based on 
an attempt to upgrade the industrial structure as a whole by moving 
into more technology- and skill-intensive niches. A key component 
of this technological upgrading was the liberalization of foreign 
investment rules.29
many of these measures, especially export-oriented industrialization 
and investment-liberalization, were, similarly, keystones in Marcos’ 
economic development plan. Phil ippine economist miranda 
enumerates these as active government intervention in all sectors of 
the economy, opening of the national economy to foreign investments 
with multiple incentives, an export-oriented industrialization strategy, 
industrial peace through tripartite (management-labor-government) 
consultations and arrangements, agricultural development which 
also emphasized government intervention, and income policy which 
cheapened the price of labor.30
However, these similar development strategies produced different 
outcomes in the two countries. Korean economist myung Soo Cha 
writes that
in the decade following the shift to [export promotion], per capita 
output doubled, and South Korea became an industrialized country: 
from 1960/62 to 1973/75 the share of agriculture in gdP [general 
28Janelli, Making Capitalism, 59.
29 Janelli, Making Capitalism, 125.
30Felipe miranda, “the Political Economy of national Plunder: the 
Philippines Under marcos,” in Memory, Truth Telling and the Pursuit of Justice: A 
Conference on the Legacies of the Marcos Dictatorship (Quezon City: Office of Research 
and Publication, ateneo de manila University, 2001), 93.
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domestic product] fell from 45 percent to 25 percent, while the share 
of manufacturing rose from 9 to 27 percent (4).31
With such growth except for the period following Park’s assassination, 
Peter Drucker reportedly said “that Korea has compressed into thirty 
years what it took the Europeans and the United States almost 200 
years, and the Japanese 100 years, to achieve.”32
the apparent success of these policies came at a steep social cost, 
especially for the lower classes:
this one-sided emphasis on economic and industrial development, 
was, however, accompanied by a sharp increase of social tensions 
within the Korean population, because the social rights of the 
labourers, the farmers and the small merchants were curtailed, while 
the members of the upper classes were able to increase their wealth 
and their possessions. The narrow working together of politics with 
the huge economic conglomerate (chaebol ) proved very propitious for 
the economic growth of the country, but disastrous for the quality 
of life for the majority of the population who were deprived of their 
fundamental rights. Thus, the influence of the trade unions was 
curbed and the opposition of farmers and the fishermen against the 
deterioration of their life situation was crushed.33
In contrast, marcos’ economic policies and strategies failed on two 
counts: they did not promote real economic development nor improve 
the life situation of the overwhelming majority. miranda writes: “If 
political economy has, as its core consideration, the distribution of 
costs, as well as benefits attending any economic process, the vast 
majority of Filipinos can be seen as having the worst of possible worlds 
31myung Soo Cha, “the Economic History of Korea,” EH.Net Encyclopedia, 
ed. Robert Whaples, http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/cha.korea (accessed 
march 16, 2008), 4.
32Byung-Nak Song, The Rise of the Korean Economy 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), 300.
33georg Evers, The Churches in Asia (delhi: ISPCK, 2005), 53–54.
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during the time marcos and his cronies were in power” (95–100).34 
this dire situation included economic recession, huge foreign debt and 
increased capital flight as well as increase in the number of the poor 
and decrease in their quality of life.
these contrasting results of similar economic policies were brought 
about by many complex reasons such as differences in the fundamentals 
and infrastructures of the Korean and Philippine economies at that 
time. But corruption bred by authoritarian politics must be one of 
them, and though it was present in Korea under Park and Chun, the 
impact of “the politics of plunder” under marcos and his cronies placed 
an unconscionable burden on the Philippines which “had been bled 
of billions of dollars and had become the ‘basket case of Asia’ by the 
late 1970s.”35
this national situation characterized by authoritarian governance 
and its concommitant social and economic costs was the singular 
experience that both Cardinal Kim and Cardinal Sin faced as 
archbishops of the seat of the Church in Korea and the Philippines. 
their response to it and their leadership within and beyond the Church 
were integral to their mission to preach the gospel in word and deed 
during the post-Vatican II era, but these were inevitably shaped by 
differences in the Church’s place in their nation’s historical experience 
and contemporary situation then.
Comparative statistics point to the broad outines of these crucial 
differences. According to the landmark study Korean Catholicism in the 
1970s undertaken by the Social Research Institute of Sogang University 
and commissioned by the Korean bishops and major religious superiors, 
the Catholic Church in Korea at that time “consists of a small body 
of about 800,000 Christians organized into fourteen dioceses and 
34miranda, “the Political Economy of national Plunder,” 95–100. 
35Belinda aquino, Politics of Plunder: The Philippines Under Marcos (manila: 
Great Books Trading and University of the Philippines College of Public 
administration, 1987), 117.
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approximately four hundred thousand parishes, served by slightly 
under one thousand priests. Catholics make up less than 2.5% of the 
total South Korean population.”36 But this was soon to change. Some 
thirteen years later, according to Cardinal Kim himself, “the increase 
in numbers, the growth of churches all over the country, the constant 
influx of students into our seminaries and the enthusiasm and active 
involvement of so many lay people” lead many in the Christian world to 
see Korea as a ‘success story’.” [1988]37 this change “from 800,000 to 2.5 
million “ was reported to have taken place “under his leadership.”38
Such growth notwithstanding, Catholicism remains a minority 
religion in Korea with Buddhists totaling 4.9m, Confucians 4.4m and 
Protestants 3.1m in 1969.39 given these religious demographics and 
despite some negative perceptions about those of other religions, the 
Sogang survey concludes: 
Korea’s society is religiously pluralistic to such a degree that every 
religion in the country is clearly a minority religion. this situation 
contributes to an equality among the major religions—at least in terms 
of social and political power—which gives their members and leaders 
a certain sense of security and confidence in dealing with each other. 
This secure atmosphere, in turn, makes possible the generally friendly 
relations which prevail among the major religions in Korea.40
this atmosphere has made possible cooperation between the Catholic 
Church and others from different persuasions, religious or otherwise:
36William Biernatzski, et. al., Korean Catholicism in the 1970s: A Christian 
Community Comes of Age (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1975), xi.
37Kim, The Complete Collection of Cardinal Kim I, 232.
38“In memoriam Cardinal Stephen Kim Sou-hwan,” Chosun Ilbo (Feb. 
18, 2009), 1.
39Biernatzski, Korean Catholicism, table 7-1, page 104.
40Biernatzski, Korean Catholicism, 89.
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It [Catholicism] has areas of mutual understanding with Buddhism and 
Protestantism and is not strongly disliked by many among the non-
religious population or many traditional Confucians. this pivotal position 
gives the Church a potential for encouraging interfaith cooperation 
which is probably unique among Korean religious bodies.41
In contrast to its minority status in Korea, Catholicism has been and 
remains an overwhelming majority religion in the Philippines—often 
identified, despite Timor Leste’s 2002 independence, as “the only 
Catholic country in asia” with the third largest Catholic Church in 
the world. according to moreno, “it is estimated that the percentage 
of Catholics relative to the total population in the Philippines ranged 
from 82 to 84 percent in the years from 1985 to 1995.”42 In the 2000 
National Statistics Office report, Islam accounts for 5.06% of the 
population, more than any other Christian group, mainline or not.
Even with the entry of Protestant evangelical, fundamentalist 
and charismatic groups in the 1980s as well as with the exposure of 
Filipinos to religious groups other than Catholicism through media 
and migration, most Filipinos indicate their religion as Catholic despite 
the considerable range in religious practice and involvement among 
them.43 a preparatory document for the 1991 Second Plenary Council 
of the Philippines (PCP II) “notes that only 20 percent of the Catholic 
population are catechized, 10 percent are regular churchgoers and 
recipients of the sacraments, while a mere ‘2% belong to Church-
related affairs’.”44
41Biernatzski, Korean Catholicism, 89–90.
42antonio moreno, Church, State and Civil Society in Postauthoritarian Philippines: 
Narratives of Engaged Citizenship (Quezon City: ateneo de manila University 
Press, 2006), 33.
43Christl Kessler and Jürgen rüland, Give Jesus a Hand! Charismatic Christians: 
Populist Religion and Politics in the Philippines (Quezon City: ateneo de manila 
University Press, 2008), 91.
44moreno, Church, State and Civil Society, 34.
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However, the social influence of Christianity in the Philippines 
extends beyond these numbers. Its 16th century entry into the archipelago’s 
scattered native settlements except those already muslim, its involvement 
with Spanish colonial governance and its historical role in the 19th 
nationalist and revolutionary movements have all contributed to an 
enduring national polity and ethos shaped by Christianity. Hence, though 
most Catholics are “unchurched, uninvolved, and untouched by the 
parish,”45 they have been socialized and remain familiar with Christian 
stories and symbols.46 Signs of these religious stories and symbols are 
often found in public, communal, familial and personal domains, and 
their symbolic power unleashed during times of an extraordinary nature 
or “liminality” such as the 1986 People Power revolution.
Because of Christianity’s historic role in the construction of the 
Philippine nation-state and of local culture as well as its overwhelming 
majority in contemporary society, Filipino Christianity as a whole 
continues to be a potent social presence and force. though certainly not 
monolithic in many respects, the Catholic Church, its primary institutional 
form, acts like and is seen as “the church of the majority” in the Philippine 
social landscape even with emerging signs of religious pluralism.
In contrast, the Catholic Church in Korea has remained the 
“little flock” with “little prospect of major increases … in the near 
future.”47 this affects not only its strategy for evangelizing mission 
but also its location in society. as in the case of the Catholic Church 
in the Philippines, this situation of the Korean Catholic Church is 
linked to its earlier history marked by persecutions during the 19th 
century. as the Sogang study states, “modern Catholicism, too, cannot 
45moreno, Church, State and Civil Society, 34.
46Jose mario Francisco, “Christianity as Church and Story and the Birth 
of the Filipino nation in the nineteenth Century,” in The Cambridge History 
of Christianity: World Christianities c.1815–c.1914, eds. Sheridan gilley and Brian 
Stanley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 532–34.
47Biernatzski, Korean Catholicism, 170.
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avoid the continuing influence, however subtle, of the persecutions 
which wracked its first hundred years,” and one of the “enduring 
characteristics stamped upon the Korean Catholic community during 
the persecutions” is “the rural and ‘catacomb’ nature of community—
perhaps ‘ghetto’ might better describe the continuation of this trait in 
post-persecution times ….”48
From within this “little flock” on the Korean social landscape, 
Cardinal Kim carried on the mission of evangelization in post-Vatican 
II times, just as Cardinal Sin fulfilled the same task from within “the 
church of the majority” in the Philippines. they each exercised their 
decisive leadership against authoritarian regimes within the respective 
stature and ethos of the Catholic Church in their nations.
Their Pastoral Response as Leaders in Context
one does not diminish the decisive contributions of Cardinal 
Kim and Cardinal Sin towards democratization in their countries by 
pointing out two external factors that facilitated these contributions 
and magnified their impact within and beyond the Catholic Church. 
First, the theological and juridical foundations of clerical leadership 
in the Catholic Church, as well as the dominant status of traditional 
leaders in both Korean and Philippine cultures, provide fertile ground 
for the emergence of the kind of strong leadership exercised by both 
cardinal-archbishops. Because of the centrality of ordained hierarchy 
in the Catholic understanding of Church and its juridical expression 
in church governance, the position of archbishop assumes de facto 
dominance, notwithstanding post-Vatican II reforms in theological 
understanding and canon law. moreover, Kim and Sin were archbishops 
of Seoul and manila—the seat of the Catholic Church as well as the 
capital city in both countries. Upon their installation as cardinal, they 
took on an additional honorific title bestowed by the Pope. Thus 
48Biernatzski, Korean Catholicism, 171.
18 Francisco
even without the presidency in the Catholic bishops’ conference in 
their countries, they were often perceived to be the Church’s highest 
local prelate. In the light of all these then and regardless of their own 
leadership styles, whatever they said or did was bound to be received 
with considerable authority.
this authority from their position as cardinal-archbishop in the 
most prominent episcopal seats in their respective countries is further 
reinforced by traditional Korean and Philippine history and culture. 
The Sogang study hypothesized the influence of Confucian and 
monarchical tradition thus:
[Korean Catholics] could be expeced to have inherited a tradition 
which sacralized hierarchy and authority in social relationships. When 
applied to the clergy, this authoritarian tendency would be reinforced 
by the central role played by the priest in the Catholic communities 
during the persecutions. the clergy could be expected to respond 
to the community’s expectation of authoritarianism by interpreting 
their role according to the only type-pattern of non-kinship authority 
readily available for imitation in nineteenth-century Korea: that of 
the yangban official.49
The study appears to confirm such a hypothesis. The surveyed Korean 
Catholics considered relations between bishops and priests as well 
as authoritarian attitudes among the clergy as tension areas (138),50 
but the study concludes that “if the Korean church moves forward, 
therefore, it will do so at the initiative of the bishops or it will not 
move at all” (172).51
49Biernatzski, Korean Catholicism, 22.
50The study appears to confirm such a hypothesis. The surveyed Korean 
Catholics considered relations between bishops and priests as well as 
authoritarian attidues among the clergy as tension areas (Biernatzski, Korean 
Catholicism, 138).
51But the study concludes that “if the Korean church moves forward, therefore, 
it will do so at the initiative of the bishops or it will not move at all” (Biernatzski, 
Korean Catholicism, 172).
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traditional Philippine culture similarly supports such authoritarian 
and leader-centered governance in social and religious affairs. In his 
study of pre-Hispanic native settlements, Scott states that their leader, 
called datu, “was expected to govern his people, lead them in war, 
protect them from their enemies, settle their disputes, and—as good 
administrator dr. morga said—succor them in their struggles and 
needs.”52 With the coming of Christianity, the parish priest practically 
took on many of these roles:
given the inadequate number of colonial personnel to administer 
newly gathered territories, he represented de facto church as well as 
colonial authority, and took on multiple tasks such building roads or 
teaching new techniques in agriculture. He also played a crucial role in 
the colony’s social organization: first, by enticing local leaders to teach 
catechism and lead prayers for the dying in barrios too remote for the 
priest to attend to and second, by organizing them into sodalities and 
confraternities like those in Europe and the New World.53
this conjuncture of clerical and cultural forces provided the stage for 
the decisive and strong leadership of both Cardinal Kim and Cardinal 
Sin. Even without regard for their personal styles, both proved to be 
strong and effective leaders despite the spirit of anti-authoritarianism 
and democraticization current within and beyond the Church then.
Second, emerging changes in the Catholic Church at large and in 
both countries then coincided with the episcopacies of both and thus 
made possible their leadership. these changes within the Church—
iconically symbolized by Vatican II—were part of and, at the same 
time, a response to great, at times turbulent, global changes. Cries for 
freedom and equality, for justice and human development as well as 
denunciations against individuals and institutions allied with the status 
quo rang throughout the world. these cries and denunciations found 
52William Henry Scott, Barangay: Sixteenth-Century Philippine Culture and Society 
(Quezon City: ateneo de manila University Press, 1994), 221.
53Jose mario C. Francisco, “the Philippines,” in Christianities in Asia, ed. Peter 
C. Phan (West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 101–02.
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their target in the authoritarian regimes of Park and Chun in Korea 
and of marcos in the Philippines. this new political reality and its 
social and economic consequences could not but demand a response 
from the Catholic Church, whatever it might be, and in the process, 
changes within it.
The response of “the little flock” of Korean Catholics and its 
effects on the Catholic Church were shaped by its relations to those 
in power and to opposition groups in civil society. In part due to 
Christianity’s minority status, the Catholic Church and even the 
Protestant Churches did not have many and deep ties to those in the 
Park and Chun governments, and thus the possibility of being coopted 
was less likely. Park considered himself a Buddhist, and thus “renovated 
Buddhist temples” and 
also managed to control Buddhist organizations, and forced 
declarations of allegiance from believers, drafted monks into the 
military services, and disciplined dissenting monks. Probably due to 
South Korea’s dependence on security support from the United States 
and to the strongly conservative (viz., anticommunist) bent of Korean 
Christians, the regime did not attempt to manipulate the churches as 
it did Buddhist temples.54
despite this, Catholic leaders and laity had varying reactions to the 
state. Such division within the Church is not surprising in the light of 
the Sogang survey results: “the impression that emerges—both from 
the data and from observations of the behavior of Koreans as they 
try to meet the challenges of the new, dynamic world culture—is of a 
basic conservatism” but “relieved to some degree by a willingness to 
undertake moderate changes slowly and by a scattering of resourceful 
adaptations to particular new situations.”55 thus
54tun-Jen Cheng and deborah Brown, “Introduction: the roles of religious 
organizations in asian democratization,” in Religious Organizations and 
Democraticization: Case Studies from Contemporary Asia, eds. tun-Jen Cheng and 
Deborah Brown (Armonk and London: M.E. Sharpe, 2006), 22.
55Biernatzski, Korean Catholicism, 66.
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no group surveyed showed any tendency towards what could be 
termed a ‘revolutionary’ attitude towards social change. Priests and 
seminarians were perhaps the most ‘liberal’ groups polled, as well as 
being the groups most open to new options in the Church’s response 
to the social needs of the times …. this individualistic, somewhat 
conservative attitude towards social change among Korean Catholics 
may have been changed somewhat by the various public protests 
against injustice in Korean society issued by the bishops since the 
survey was taken.56
these differences, however, did not prevent the rise of what Korean 
sociologist Im classifies as “resisters” rather than ”adapters” or 
“conformists.”57 though the conservative Bishops’ Conference 
and the progressive Catholic Priests’ association for Justice (CPaJ) 
exchanged denunciations from mid-1970s to the early 1980s, Catholic 
activists, though a minority within the Church, acquired hegemony. 
aside from the Church’s high premium on unity, in fact or at least 
in appearance, informal interaction and communication between the 
activists and others in the Catholic Church continued. moreover, the 
increasing repression of the authoritarian regime, especially arrests of 
clergy such as Wonju Bishop Chi Hak-sun in 1974 and Fr. Ch’oi Ki-
sik in 1982,58 made it more difficult even for church conservatives not 
to support resistance to the state which “came to believe that their 
[the activists’s] progressive stance reflected the position held by the 
56thus “no group surveyed showed ay tendency towards what could be termed 
a ‘revolutionary’ attitude towards social change. Priests and seminarians were 
perhaps the most ‘liberal’ groups polled, as well as being the groups most open 
to new options in the Church’s response to the social needs of the times…this 
individualistic, somewhat conservative attitude towards social change among 
Korean Catholics may have been changed somewhat by the various public 
protests against injustice in Korean society issued by the bishops since the 
survey was taken” (Biernatzski, Korean Catholicism, 161).
57Cheng and Brown, “the roles of religious organizations,” 33. 
58Don Baker, “From Pottery to Politics: The Transformation of Korean 
Catholicism,” in Religion and Society in Contemporary Korea, eds. lewis lancaster and 
Richard Payne (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997), 153–55.
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entire Korean Catholic Church.”59 this show of solidarity, in contrast 
to the fragmentation within the Protestant Churches, “led Korean 
people to perceive that Catholics had contributed more to Korean 
democratization than Protestants.”60
the relations of the Korean Catholic Church to other groups 
during this period also shaped its response to authoritarian rule. 
according to the Sogang survey, all groups questioned supported 
ecumenical cooperation, and “a huge majority of 90.65[%] of the 
sample [lay Catholics] agreed with the statement, ‘Catholics should 
work together with non-Catholics to build up a good social order.’”61 
Given this, the Catholics were disposed to work with Protestants in 
facing authoritarian regimes.
the Korean Catholic Church collaborated with groups in civil 
society to the mutual benefit of both parties. As Im puts it, on the one 
hand, “Korean Christian churches not only were actively involved in 
democratization to seek legitimacy in the eyes of their constituencies, 
but also they passively accepted the invitation from social movements to 
join the struggle for democratization.”62 on the other, “antigovernment 
social movements needed churches because they believed that churches 
could lend moral authority to their movements and provide shelter to 
them from the harsh repression of authoritarian officials.”63
59Hyug Baeg Im, “Christian Churches and democratization in South Korea,” in 
Religious Organizations and Democraticization: Case Studies from Contemporary Asia, eds. tun-
Jen Cheng and Deborah Brown (Armonk and London: M.E. Sharpe, 2006), 151.
60Im, “Christian Churches and democratization in South Korea,” 151.
61according to the Sogang survey, all groups questioned supported ecumenical 
cooperation, and “a huge majority of 90.65 of the sample [lay Catholics] agreed 
with the statement, ‘Catholics should work together with non-Catholics to build 
up a good social order’” (Biernatzski, Korean Catholicism, 88).
62 Im, “Christian Churches and democratization in South Korea,” 142.
63 Im, “Christian Churches and democratization in South Korea,” 142.
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these two factors—the traditional Korean and Catholic ethos 
of leadership as well as the emergent changes in the Korean Catholic 
Church—put the Church in an unique position during the period 
of authoritarian rule, one that even Park himself identified as “the 
Catholic problem.”64
Perhaps not suprisingly, social dynamics similar to those in the 
Korean Catholic Church were undergone by the Catholic Church in the 
Philippines, only writ large because of its long tradition and majority 
population. during marcos’ authoritarian rule, hierarchy and laity 
were similarly divided into what Im categorized in the Korean case as 
“adaptors,” “conformists” and “resisters.” Youngblood estimates that 
“in 1979, forty-six bishops were classified as conservatives, eighteen 
moderates, and fifteen progressives.”65 at the Church’s lower levels, 
however, many organizations like the Association of Major Religious 
Superiors of the Philippines (AMRSP), church instrumentalities like 
the national Secretariat for Social action (naSSa) and religious 
communities engaged in direct work with the poor and marginalized 
were already critical of marcos’ regime. Still many causes of these 
divisions in the Korean Catholic Church were similarly operative 
among Filipino Catholics; among them would be splits between pre- 
and post-Vatican II mentalities, between rural and urban populations, 
and even between generations.
In the Philippine case, however, these divisions are complicated by 
two distinct factors. First, many prominent Catholics—whether bishop, 
clergy or lay—had strong social bonds with those in power, most of 
whom, like Marcos and his family, were Catholic. These bonds came 
from traditional sources of alliances in Philippine society—kinship 
by blood or affinity, regional origin, links brought about by religious 
rites like being godparents, membership in voluntary organizations 
like school fraternities, and “belonging to the same circles” or, in 
64 Hanson, Catholic Politics in China and Korea, 4.
65moreno, Church, State and Civil Society, 42.
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other words, class origin. moreover, the marcos regime, especially in 
the person of Imelda Marcos, cultivated bonds with Church officials 
through financial contributions to church projects or socializing with 
them at social occasions. Photographs of mrs. marcos dining with 
bishops like Cardinal Sin were widely circulated. These personal links 
therefore made it more difficult for the Catholic Church to disentangle 
itself from the establishment. Mrs. Marcos was known to have asked 
Papal nuncio archbishop Bruno torpigliani to pressure the CBCP not 
to issue their 1986 statement about the regime’s lack of legitimacy.66
Second, divisions within the Philippine Catholic Church were 
further complicated because ideological cleavages in Philippine society 
were at play within the Church. aside from the right wing, many 
of whom were associated with the regime, there were independent 
liberals and liberal democrats. But the ideological division that made 
the Church’s response to the regime more difficult was between the 
so-called “natdems” and “socdems” in the Church. The first “aligned 
themselves with the Communist Party of the Philippines-national 
democratic Front-new People’s army (CPP-ndF-nPa)” and “offered 
a Marxist-Leninist-Maoist framework for social transformation.”67 
Christians for national liberation (Cnl) “became the church sector 
in the underground left that was engaged in the mobilization of 
church personnel and resources in aid of the armed revolution waged 
by the revolutionary left, and in the transformation of churches 
around national democratic principles.”68 the second—advocates of 
social democracy and initially open to an armed component—“were 
vigorously anticommunist, but committed to social justice and political 
transformation.”69 theirs was an intense rivalry: “Both groups subtly 
vied with one another in occupying key establishments and positions 
66moreno, Church, State and Civil Society, 49.
67moreno, Church, State and Civil Society, 42.
68moreno, Church, State and Civil Society, 43.
69moreno, Church, State and Civil Society, 43.
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of influence within the church. Both competed in recruiting members 
and sympathizers within the church.”70
though this ideological cleavage within the Church as well as the 
Church’s entanglement with those in power made the Church’s response 
to the marcos regime more complex, what proved helpful were the 
links of the Church with professional groups like FLAG (Free Legal 
Assistance Group) or community organizing networks like COPE 
(Community organization of Philippine Enterprises) as well as with 
local people’s organizations. as in Korea, their association with the 
Church offered legitimacy and protection to these groups against the 
instrumentalities of authoritarian government. though these groups 
were not formally connected to the Church, these links were forged 
because many of their members were Catholic, and some even had 
long-standing personal relations with clergy, religious and lay active in 
church affairs. this was similarly applied to opposition groups such 
as traditional political parties and human rights advocates.
given the Church’s ideological divisions as well as its intricate 
relations with those in power and those without, its protests against 
authoritarianism were not stifled. This occurred, as in Korea, when 
the Philippine Catholic Church became increasingly aware of the 
growing repression and brutality of the marcos regime, let alone 
the worsening plight of the vast majority of the population. Church 
people—at the beginning, many vulnerable laity, but later, also some 
religious and priests—were harassed, arrested and even “salvaged.” 
raids were conducted on religious houses, the most dramatic being the 
1976 military raid with helicopters and armored vehicles on the Jesuit 
Sacred Heart novitiate, the venue then of an international meeting of 
religious sisters. this drew an equally dramatic response—a mass in 
protest at the manila Cathedral presided over by Cardinal Sin. With 
this and many other events leading to the brutal climax in ninoy 
aquino’s assassination, witnessed on international television, the 
70moreno, Church, State and Civil Society, 44.
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Catholic Church became the de facto voice of the vast majority suffering 
at the hands of the regime.
Within these new contours of the Catholic Church in Korea and 
the Philippines emerging in the face of authoritarian rule, one must 
place the strong and decisive leadership of Cardinal Kim and Cardinal 
Sin. though they certainly contributed much to the emergence of 
these contours, their words and deeds as leaders were equally shaped 
by these contours.
listening to their words through an almost random sampling of 
their published texts during the authoritarian periods in their countries 
offers some insights into their contribution to democratization. their 
words on development and justice in general and against authoritarian 
rule in particular came, as expected, from their focus on the evangelizing 
mission of the Church in love. Both were also critical of the promises 
of Communism as well as of the ills of capitalist ideology.
However, their different locations—Cardinal Kim within “the 
little flock” and Cardinal Sin within “the church of the majority” 
—influence the volume and nuances of their words. Because of the 
numerous opportunities in the Philippines for a prominent prelate 
to speak on urgent social issues, Cardinal Sin’s talks and homilies 
on these issues were numerous.71 they were addressed to audiences 
almost as wide and diverse as Philippine society. these included those 
in church groups like the CBCP, clergy, religious communities and 
lay associations as well as those in the wider society such as a rotary 
Club or the ambassadors’ association of the Philippines. though 
many appeared in church publications including Ichthys, the amrSP’s 
mimeographed antidote to censored mainstream media, some came out 
in local publications like Impact or The Fookien Times Philippines Yearbook 
or in international magazines such as Far Eastern Economic Review. 
Some were open letters on particular issues addressed to government 
71James Kroeger, Human Promotion as an Integral Dimension of the Church of 
Evangelization: A Philippine Experience and Perspective since Vatican II—1965–1984 
(rome: gregorian University, 1985), 82–109.
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officials like Defense Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile [August 27, 1974], 
general Fidel ramos [december 28, 1974] and even President marcos 
[november 12, 1975].
Beneath this diversity of audience and volume of output lies an 
underlying concern for the rightful place of Christian involvement in 
society. Whoever the audience were and whatever the occasion, Cardinal 
Sin appeared bent on clearing obstacles to Christian social involvement 
whether in the form of “pseudo-spiritual verticalism” or of “a radical 
horizontalism.” [1973]72 For more formal occasions, he resorted to 
technical language as in the 1973 biannual CBCP meeting:
although the Church, as religious community is by her nature and 
purpose, above, or better, beyond any political system, it is also her 
task and part of her mission to cast the light of her faith on the entire 
temporal, and therefore, on the political order, because ‘her religious 
mission is by the same token a human one, and she has to serve the 
welfare of all men.’ [1973]73
to the 1983 Bishops-Businessmen’s Conference (BBC), he used Jesuit 
John Courtney Murray’s thought—also reflected on the Vatican II 
document on religious liberty—to stress that “the Church believes that 
integral human development requires a political order that can guarantee 
stability, security and freedom to its citizenry. Here is a tradition of order 
and rationality in civic affairs, not of chaos or anarchy.”74
But in situations directly pastoral and urgent, such as the funeral 
mass for ninoy aquino, Cardinal Sin’s words could not have been 
more direct in stressing the dire need for Christian involvement:
With the Supreme Pontiff, the Church in the Philippines renews her 
pledge to bring about—and I quote—‘a truly human society where all 
men, women and children receive what is due to them to live in dignity: 
where especially the poor and the underprivileged are made the priority 
72dumol, A Cry … A Song, 34.
73dumol, A Cry … A Song, 33.
74dumol, A Cry … A Song, 130.
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concern of all.’ and I need not tell you, my friends, that Pope John Paul 
II uttered those words right in malacañang in February 1981. [1983]75
Along with other groups within the Church like the CBCP, this 
shift toward more direct criticism in Cardinal Sin’s words was due to 
the increasingly oppressive nature of the marcos regime not only to 
political opponents or leftist activists but also the poor majority and 
the middle class, not to mention Catholic institutions and communities. 
In 1973, he said “Praising, assenting, and encouraging, or criticizing, 
dissenting and protesting? These are all different forms of the 
‘wholesome cooperation’ we must offer to the political community.”76 
But from 1978 onward, he has shifted to “critical collaboration”—a 
phrase adopted too by the CBCP:
it holds that the Church will support all governmental actions that 
promote the common good and are consistent with Christian values 
and principles …. on the other hand, the Church will not hesitate 
to denounce any act or decree contrary to Christian teaching, that 
diminishes, if not actually suppresses individual rights, where torture, 
illegal detentions, corruption in office are enforced. [1983/1984]77
though too many government acts and decrees had to be denounced 
in the 1980s and hence emphasis had clearly shifted to “critical,” 
Cardinal Sin had never ceased to speak of reconciliation. At that same 
1983 BBC meeting with Prime minister Cesar Virata present, he dared 
to offer an alternative political structure
… why don’t we form some sort of council made up of three members in 
the government led by you, mr. Prime minister, and two other cabinet 
ministers, three members from the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the 
Philippines led by the incumbent President—hopefully, archbishop 
Mabutas will make me one of the members—two members of the 
opposition and two members from the private sector …. this council 
will invite suggestions from the people on a broad range of subjects. 
75dumol, A Cry … A Song, 135.
76 dumol, A Cry … A Song, 38.
77Kroeger, Human Promotion, 350.
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It will then discuss this and, drawing from its manifold resources and 
expertise, refine them or discard them, as the case may be. And then, 
after it has arrived at a consensus, the council can present this to the 
President for implementation.”78
this offer could arguably be construed as his crossing the line into the 
strictly political but could also be an indication of the lengths that he 
was willing to go to for the sake of some form of reconciliation and 
peace. With his offer neither publicly addressed nor accepted, his voice 
calling all to go to EdSa on February 25, 1986 was simply a matter 
of time. this act of Cardinal Sin became his iconic gesture against 
authoritarianism and toward democratization in the Philippines.
In contrast to this dramatic act of Cardinal Sin, Cardinal Kim’s 
contribution to Korea’s democratization was a long series of words and 
deeds of solidarity with the suffering poor under authoritarian regimes. 
these words and deeds were consistent, indicating no major shifts in 
attitude as in the case of Cardinal Sin. as Hanson points out,
as early as the 1972 Christmas midnight mass in myongdong cathedral, 
Cardinal Kim issued a warning to President Park; ‘Your action [the 
new Constitution] will help widen the already existent gap between the 
people and the government, and will eventually lead to a government 
without people and a people without a leader’ (101).79
What he said and did was more than sufficient for him to be called 
“Korea’s spiritual president” or “kun orun [the great elder].”
In many instances, this leader of “the little flock” spoke with many 
others, especially Protestants and groups of workers and students, as 
at the 1976 ecumenical prayer meeting protesting the arrest of those 
who issued the “declaration for democratic national Salvation.”80 
When he spoke in his voice, his words were straightforward and 
78 dumol, A Cry … A Song, 133–4.
79 Hanson, Catholic Politics in China and Korea, 101.
80 Hanson, Catholic Politics in China and Korea, 99.
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simple, concerned with direct pastoral response rather than any 
reasoned justification for Christian involvement in society. According 
to reports, “when President Chun doo-hwan visited him shortly after 
taking power in a military coup in 1979, the cardinal chastised him, 
comparing his illegal seizure of the government to ‘an outlaw gunfight 
in a Western movie.’”81
Cardinal Kim’s strong critique of authoritarianism derived from 
the profound belief of the core of democracy. In “When comes the 
Dawn of Democracy?”, his Christmas homily soon after the 1987 
presidential elections, he said
the democracy we seek is humanization itself, rather than just a mere 
democratic system. It is to construct a society in which men can live 
as dignified human beings whom God created and the Messiah saved 
through the shedding of His blood.82
these words could only come from the heart of one truly in solidarity 
with the suffering poor. His talks and homilies referred to “the poor, to 
those who weep, to those who are alienated and marginalized.” [1997]83 
He wrote in his essay for gustavo gutierrez’ 60th birthday that “the 
anawim of Scripture, the marginales of latin america, the minjoong 
of Korea, the poor and oppressed ‘little’ ones of the whole world are 
clearly the salt of the earth.” [1988]84 Because of this privileged place 
of the suffering in his heart, he was attentive to them, wherever and 
whoever they were. deeply pained by the situation of north Korean 
Catholics who legally belonged to his archdiocese, he
81New York Times obituary, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/17/world/
asia/17kim.html (accessed January 10, 2012).
82Stephen Sou-Hwan Kim, The Complete Collection of Cardinal Kim Vol. V (Seoul: 
Catholic Publishing House, 2001), 262.
83Kim, The Complete Collection of Cardinal Kim I, 279–80.
84Stephen Sou-Hwan Kim, The Complete Collection of Cardinal Kim Vol. IX (Seoul: 
Catholic Publishing House, 2001), 205.
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believe[d] there must be existing the Church as the mystical Body 
of Christ. and there is the priesthood of Christ, even though there 
is no ministerial priesthood. Why? Because our Lord Jesus Christ, 
who Himself is priest, must be with them and among them, sharing 
their suffering with them, and carrying them also the Cross of 
redemption. [no date]85
Without condoning the suffering of women, he recognized that
women, because of their past experience, can bring to bear a unique 
vision of the relationship between family and the Church, which, in 
turn, embraces all of society: the man in the street, the child in the 
home, the deprived, the helpless, minorities, and the marginal and 
forgotten women. [1985]86
to all these suffering, “Jesus reveals to us the wonder of the Compassion 
of God. The word ‘Compassion’ comes from Latin. It means ‘to share 
the suffering of one who suffers.’” [1992]87 morever, the god Jesus 
reveals is “a Poor god” whose evangelizing “was a process of total 
giving, of complete emptying of Himself.” [1979]88 thus Cardinal 
Kim emphatically insisted that after “seek[ing] out Jesus and ask[ing] 
for His healing,” the Church “must know poverty experientially and 
existentially. not by researching poverty, not by studying the poor, 
not by interviews or statistics, but by being poor.”89
all these words of solidarity with the poor Cardinal Kim sought 
to live, and though he was certainly not extravagant in lifestyle, he 
put himself down too harshly by saying that “my dream to live with 
85Kim, The Complete Collection of Cardinal Kim IX, 12.
86Kim, The Complete Collection of Cardinal Kim V, 321.
87Kim, The Complete Collection of Cardinal Kim I, 257.
88Stephen Sou-Hwan Kim, The Complete Collection of Cardinal Kim Vol. VI (Seoul: 
Catholic Publishing House, 2001), 445.
89Kim, The Complete Collection of Cardinal Kim VI, 446.
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the poor couldn’t be realised, not because of my post as cardinal but 
because of my lack of courage.”90
His most significant deed for the suffering poor, however, was to 
offer them hospitality. Columban donal o’Keeffe recalls how
in 1986 when Seoul city evicted people to make room for a new 
development in preparation for the 1988 olympics the cardinal invited 
the families to live in the cathedral grounds. He set up two huge tents 
and there, in the heart of the business and tourist centre of Seoul, 
those families lived with meals being cooked in the church yard and 
children playing around the entrance to the cathedral.”91
The following year “students took refuge in the grounds after a rally 
for democracy and the police threatened to come in and arrest them. 
But the cardinal told the government: ‘If you come in you will first 
have to trample over me, then the priests, then the sisters and only 
then will you take the students.’”92
His act of opening up the myungdong Cathedral made it “the 
Catholic center for sit-in protests among the democratic opposition, 
striking workers, and the urboan poor.”93 Brother anthony of taize 
recalls witnessing these occasions:
“I shall never forget listening to his sermons in myongdong Cathedral 
at certain moments of great crisis and tension, standing in the packed 
church. I could feel how carefully he was choosing his words in order to 
indicate clearly the challenging message of the gospel, never proposing 
some easy kind of emotion that would have no effect. It was clear that 
90“Priestly dream Unrealized, Cardinal Kim Says in memoirs,” UCan Press 
release Ko7873.1332, march 18, 2005, emailed January 12, 2012.
91donal o’Keeffe, “Stephen Cardinal Sou-Hwan rIP,” Misyon Online ( July–
August 2009), http://www.misyononline.com/index.php?q=julaug2009.korea 
(accessed Jan. 5, 2012).
92o’Keeffe, “Stephen Cardinal Kim Sou-Hwan rIP.”
93 Im, “Christian Churches and democratization in South Korea,” 143.
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he knew no compromises, that he spoke with same voice to the simplest 
believers and to the most powerful leaders.”94
His motivation was never political, as he himself puts it: “it was an era 
of oppression, a dark era. We had no other choice but to wait for the 
truth to free us. How could a priest, as a delegate of Christ, remain 
silent at such a time?”95
As a result of such acts of solidarity which spoke even louder 
than his words, Cardinal Kim became the conscience of the nation 
and myungdong Cathedral the “holy place of democratization” since 
the 1970s:
“It was the myungdong Cathedral where the mass was held in protest 
against the arrest of Bishop Chi in 1974, the joint Catholic-Protestant 
declaration demanding restoration of democracy was announced in 
1976, and the cover-up of the torture and death of Park Chong Chui 
was revealed by the priest, Kim Seung Hun, in 1987, leading to the 
nationwide demonstrations for the restoration of democracy in June 
that year. Beside democratic opposition forces, workers, farmers, 
urban poor, and people of the ghettos took refuge at the Myungdong 
Cathedral to avoid arrest by the police.”96
this image of Cardinal Kim welcoming the suffering to myungdong 
Cathedral time and time again appropriately symbolizes his leadership 
of “the little flock” against authoritarianism. The voice of Cardinal Sin 
calling “god’s people” to EdSa at around 9 Pm, February 22, 1986 
clearly speaks too of his leadership of the “church of the majority” 
toward democratization. “Into the sanctuary” and “out to the streets” 
are not contradictory pastoral responses but two sides of the same 
evangelizing mission in different contexts.
94“Remembering Cardinal Stephen Kim Sou-Hwan,” http://www.koreatimes.
co.kr/www/include/print.asp?newsIdx=39765 (accessed January 5, 2012).
95“Cardinal Kim Sou-hwan: the First Korean Catholic Cardinal and a 
Campaigner for Human rights,” The Independent (Feb. 21, 2009), 21.
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